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I.  
What are the legitimate sources of aesthetic belief? Which methods for forming aesthetic 
belief are acceptable? Although the question is rarely framed explicitly, it is a familiar 
idea that there is something distinctive about aesthetic matters in this respect. Crudely, 
the thought is that the legitimate routes to belief are rather more limited in the aesthetic 
case than elsewhere. If so, this might tell us something about the sorts of facts that 
aesthetic beliefs describe, about the nature of our aesthetic judgements, or about the 
responses that ground them. Getting the epistemology right here may help with the 
metaphysics, the semantics or the philosophical psychology. Investigating the legitimate 
sources of aesthetic belief may thus teach us something important about the aesthetic 
realm. 
I begin with a principle that seeks to identify which sources of aesthetic belief are 
legitimate, and use it to review the possible candidates. I don’t attempt to defend the 
principle, merely to explore the shape it imposes on the phenomena. Previous discussions 
of the principle have concentrated on only some of its implications, and previous 
discussions of the possible candidate sources of aesthetic belief have overlooked some. In 
both respects, I aim to be more comprehensive. Towards the close, I suggest that the 
principle itself is interestingly ambiguous. There are two rather different positions it 
might be used to articulate. 
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II.  
The principle I discuss is, more or less, the one Richard Wollheim dubbed the 
Acquaintance Principle: ‘judgements of aesthetic value, unlike judgements of moral 
knowledge, must be based on first-hand experience of their objects and are not, except 
within very narrow limits, transmissible from one person to another’ (1980 p.233). 
However, there are some complications with Wollheim’s formulation. It restricts its claim 
to judgements of (beliefs about) aesthetic value. It draws a contrast with moral matters 
that, we will later see, is not obviously happy. And it signals a concession on the question 
of ‘transmissibility’ that seems to require a parallel concession with respect to whether 
aesthetic beliefs must indeed be ‘based on first-hand experience’—a concession 
Wollheim fails to make. Since I do not want at this stage to commit to any of these 
features, our discussion will be crisper if we begin with our own statement of the norm: 
 
Acquaintance Principle: S’s belief on an aesthetic matter is legitimate only if S has 
experienced for herself the object that belief concerns. 
 
Clearly, there is at least one route to belief that the Principle accepts—experiencing for 
oneself the object judged. But which other routes, if any, does it permit, at least if we 
interpret it sympathetically? And which does it exclude? 
 
III. 
It is clear that, at least in many cases, the Principle will rule out forming belief by 
inference from O’s other properties. Suppose that, although I’ve never seen some 
object, I know by other means that it has certain properties. My knowledge might concern 
properties such as colour and shape, which, while not themselves aesthetic, are (often) of 
relevance to aesthetic features. Or it might concern properties that are themselves 
aesthetic, such as elegance or balance. Either way, the Principle decrees that I cannot 
legitimately infer on that basis that O has some other aesthetic property. Since I have not 
experienced O for myself, I haven’t the right to the belief that pattern of inference 
purports to justify. If this claim is correct, it is significant. After all, for most properties of 
objects, inference is a perfectly acceptable way to come by knowledge of them. 
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In effect, the Principle here excludes forming aesthetic belief by appeal to what Kant 
called ‘Principles of Taste’ (Kant §34). Kant thought of these as universal generalisations 
to the effect that anything F (where that is non-aesthetic) is G (an aesthetic property).1 
Later writers have refined the notion of a Principle of Taste, weakening it to the idea of a 
pro tanto link between properties, and specifying which sorts of properties stand in these 
relations (Beardsley 1962, Dickie 2006). But that weakening does not alter the antipathy 
between such generalizations and the Acquaintance Principle. They remain ways to reach 
conclusions about aesthetic properties without necessarily having experienced the object 
for oneself and, as such, they remain beyond the boundary the Principle sets. 
As the Acquaintance Principle stands, there are appeals to Principles of Taste that 
pass it. Consider a case in which, although I draw an aesthetic conclusion from a 
Principle of Taste, my knowledge of the properties of O that figure in the premises was 
acquired in experience of O. Here the letter of the Acquaintance Principle is met—I have 
experienced O for myself. Surely its spirit, however, is not. The problem is that, while the 
Acquaintance Principle only frames a necessary condition on aesthetic belief, it is 
presumably a condition intended to reflect some further requirement: that one sees for 
oneself that the belief is true. It seems, then, that we should strengthen our formulation: 
 
Strengthened Acquaintance Principle: S’s belief on an aesthetic matter is legitimate 
only if S has experienced for herself the object that belief concerns, and on that 
basis grasps that the belief is true. 
 
Strengthened or not, antipathy to Principles of Taste is only part of the import of the 
Acquaintance Principle hereabouts. For the Principle is equally opposed to methods other 
than inference for reaching an aesthetic conclusion on the basis of knowledge of O’s 
other properties. Suppose that we agree with Sibley (1959, 1965) that one reason why 
appeal to Principles of Taste fails to legitimate aesthetic belief is that aesthetic judgement 
cannot be reduced to the application of rules, but rather requires the exercise of ‘taste’. 
Then it ought in principle to be possible, given sufficient knowledge of O’s other 
properties, to exercise one’s ‘taste’ to come to know some aspect of its aesthetic 
                                                 
1
 In fact, Kant restricted the latter property to beauty. 
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character. And this ought to be possible however one has come to know those other 
properties—including by means other than experiencing O for oneself. (Perhaps one has 
instead been given a comprehensive description of them. Sibley’s worry was that 
descriptions are always too general to capture the details on which aesthetic properties 
depend, but we can tailor the terms to the specific properties involved in the case.) Since 
ex hypothesi O has not been experienced, the Principle excludes such exercises of ‘taste’ 
as routes to aesthetic belief. They fail to count for much the same reason that blocked the 
appeal to Principles of Taste, even though here no such Principles figure. 
As a final thought on these matters, note that the Principle cannot plausibly exclude 
absolutely all inference. As has often been remarked, if I know that two things are perfect 
doubles, I can, for at least some aesthetic properties, infer that one of them enjoys those 
features on the grounds that the other does. This may not be true for every aesthetic 
property, since some are such that even perfect doubles can differ with respect to them 
(Goodman 1968 ch.3, Walton 1970). But it will be true for others. Elegance, 
harmoniousness, or beauty are examples. At least some aesthetic properties depend only 
on aspects of O’s appearance, so that if something matches O perfectly in respect of 
appearance, it simply must match it in respect of those aesthetic properties too. The point 
generalises beyond cases of perfect doubles. Since no aesthetic property depends on 
every property of an object, it should always in principle be possible to find (and to know 
one has found) another object that shares all the relevant properties, such that if the one 
has aesthetic feature F, so does the other. 
 
IV. 
Another source of aesthetic belief that the Principle excludes is the testimony of others. 
In non-aesthetic matters, we get a good number of our beliefs this way. Think, for 
instance, of your knowledge of geography or history; or of many of the details of your 
friends’ lives. By ‘testimony’ I have in mind the pure case, where we learn that p by 
someone telling us that p. I am not thinking of the more complex cases in which our 
informant backs up her claim by offering us her reasons for it. Although the matter is 
controversial, at least some have agreed with Wollheim that testimony is not a legitimate 
source of aesthetic belief. Kant was certainly sympathetic to this thought, and I think he 
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was right to be (Hopkins 2000). One might deny the legitimacy of relying on aesthetic 
testimony without holding the Acquaintance Principle. For one thing, resistance to 
testimony may not be unique to aesthetic matters. Many have thought that moral beliefs 
too cannot legitimately be adopted in this way (Hopkins 2007). Since, as Wollheim 
himself notes, the Principle is hardly tempting in moral matters, it is unclear that the 
failure of testimony and being governed by the Principle go hand in hand. Nonetheless, 
the Principle does offer one way to integrate the failure of aesthetic testimony into a 
wider epistemology of the aesthetic. Those pessimistic about such testimony need at least 
to consider whether the Principle gets that wider epistemology right.  
Note that reliance on testimony is a possible source of aesthetic belief distinct from 
any considered above. We pondered the possibility that Sibleyan taste be allowed to 
operate on a description of O’s non-aesthetic properties. That case might involve the 
acquisition by testimony of some beliefs, but precisely not the aesthetic beliefs that are 
now in question—in the earlier example, taste is our route to those. Nor does reliance on 
testimony amount to inference from knowledge of O’s other properties. It is moot 
whether inference plays any role in our acquiring knowledge from testimony. But, 
whether it does or not, it is not inference from the other properties of the object judged. 
Rather, if we infer to the belief at all, we do so from such factors as the reliability of our 
informant on such topics, and the strength of any incentive she may have to mislead us.2 
If the Acquaintance Principle excludes both reliance on testimony and reliance on 
inference, one might wonder what sense it can make of the role of the critic. Critics 
cannot, it seems, be those with specialized knowledge of the Principles of Taste 
underpinning our judgements, since there is nothing for such Principles to do. And critics 
cannot be those issuing authoritative judgements to guide the rest of us, since no one 
should take her aesthetic belief on trust from another. What, then, do critics do? There is 
an answer, familiar from the tradition of those who have denied Principles of Taste. 
                                                 
2
 These comments suffice to distinguish the case of testimony from another that is sometimes cited as 
counter-example to the Acquaintance Principle: one in which one infers to O’s possessing certain aesthetic 
properties from its effect on others. We might, for instance, form the belief that Helen of Troy was 
beautiful on the basis of the passions she aroused. This is not testimony, not even if testimony does work 
through inference. For we do not infer to her beauty on the basis of what others say, but on the basis of 
what she led them to do and feel. Nor is it a case of inference from a Principle of Taste. Such Principles 
don’t appeal to effects on others, but to the co-instantiation of the relevant aesthetic property with other 
properties, aesthetic or otherwise.  
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Critics are those skilled at bringing us to see for ourselves the truth of the aesthetic claims 
they make (Isenberg 1949; Sibley 1959, 1965, 1974; Mothersill 1984). This can hardly be 
the last word on the matter. For as it stands the reply does nothing to make room for the 
idea, dear to defenders of Principles of Taste, that criticism is a rational activity, one 
governed by reason. It is a significant question whether the reply can be expanded to 
accommodate that thought (Hopkins 2006). But, whether it can or not, defenders of the 
Acquaintance Principle are not left in the embarrassing position of having to treat all 
critical talk as mere bluster. 
 
V. 
So much for the major exclusions the Principle imposes. What of the positive side? What 
does it allow, or what should it allow if we try to stick with its spirit while making 
concessions where necessary? 
As noted, the Principle treats experience of the object judged as the central legitimate 
source of aesthetic belief. All will agree that this is the canonical route to such belief. The 
Principle goes much farther, treating it (at least until concessions are forced) as the only 
such route. However, even here, the Principle faces questions. How are we to construe 
‘experience’ so that it covers the full range of objects of aesthetic interest? In particular, 
how are we to understand it so as to allow the Principle to govern our engagement with 
literature? At the least, it seems that ‘experience’ cannot mean ‘perceptual experience’. 
For, while we usually access literature via our senses, their role there is far less central 
than in the case of the musical or visual arts. It is not even clear that literature must, in 
principle, be so accessed—might I not compose a poem in my head, and later enjoy it in 
recollection? However, while it is an awkward question how to construe ‘experience’ so 
as to give the Principle both plausibility and the right scope, I will set it aside. I want to 
concentrate on some more straightforward potential concessions. 
 
VI. 
At least for those aesthetic properties that can be appreciated visually, one possible 
method for finding out about them is to look at a picture of the object in question. This 
won’t work for every visually accessible aesthetic feature, but it certainly seems to work 
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for some. Consider the special case of pictures of pictures. While much of Cezanne’s 
intensity is lost in reproduction, the blandness of Hopper is perfectly preserved therein. A 
similar point holds for objects of aesthetic interest that are not themselves pictures. While 
the grandeur of a mountain scene is hard to capture pictorially, there are many things—
buildings, other landscapes, cars, clothes and people—that we take ourselves to know to 
be beautiful, clumsy or striking even though we have only seen pictures of them. As 
formulated, the Acquaintance Principle threatens to force us to abandon these aesthetic 
beliefs. Since we have not seen these items for ourselves, we have no right to hold beliefs 
about their aesthetic aspects. Forced to choose between the Principle and these beliefs, we 
may well prefer to modify the Principle. 
The pressure to modify here is distinct from any encountered above. Looking at 
pictures of things cannot be treated as a special form of reliance on testimony. I see 
nothing wrong with the idea that pictures can be vehicles of testimony, as can words. 
However, they do not testify to their object’s aesthetic properties. A picture of a beautiful 
object is not the equivalent of a description asserting that it is lovely. The picture doesn’t 
demand our agreement with the claim that the thing is beautiful, for it doesn’t make that 
claim at all. Rather, it shows us the object’s other properties, and thereby puts us in a 
position to judge the thing’s beauty for ourselves. Hence if two disagree over the beauty 
of what is depicted, neither need take himself to be rejecting the content of the picture, 
rather than the judgement his companion made on that basis. 
Do pictures perhaps then play the role of more discreet descriptions, giving us 
knowledge of O’s other properties, and allowing us on that basis to discover that it is 
beautiful, either by inference from general principles, or by non-rule bound exercise of 
Sibleyan taste? They do not. For pictures do not simply put us in a position to judge their 
objects’ aesthetic qualities—they also allow us to savour them (Hopkins 1997). They 
allow not merely for the formation of aesthetic belief, but for the full-blooded reactions, 
be they affective, cognitive or whatever, which are, in the aesthetic case, the grounds for 
belief. The beauty of the Taj Mahal or of one of Elisabeth Vigée Lebrun’s heroines is not 
merely there in pictures of them as something to be noted, it can be enjoyed. Since the 
process of forming a judgement, by rule-bound means or not, could not be all there is to 
the process of engaging with beauty and other aesthetic properties, we cannot reduce the 
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role of pictures in our acquisition of aesthetic belief to that of mere sources of 
information. 
However, if we are looking to reduce the pictorial route to aesthetic belief to some 
other, there is an obvious strategy for the Acquaintance Principle to adopt. It should claim 
that to see a picture of O is simply a way to experience O for oneself. That keeps down 
the range of candidate methods for forming aesthetic belief in such a way as to render it 
unnecessary to modify the Principle. Unfortunately, this strategy is in the end no easier to 
run than the others. It is true, of course, that to see a picture of O, unlike reading a 
description of O, is to have a visual experience that in some way involves O. But it is 
quite another matter to claim, as Wollheim has done (Wollheim 2003), that it counts as a 
visual experience of O. It certainly need not do so in the sense that it counts as a 
perception of O. Walton argued for that claim where the picture in question is a 
photograph (Walton 1984). However, since photographs are not the only pictures that 
offer us ways to explore the aesthetic aspects of their objects, Walton’s claim does not 
cover all the cases now before us. Nor can we interpret Wollheim’s claim as saying that 
pictures give us illusions as of their objects—experiences that, while not counting as 
perceptions of O, nonetheless match the phenomenology of such perceptions. For that is 
simply untrue. Pictorial experience differs radically from face-to-face experience, and 
this is something Wollheim himself knew perfectly well. But in what sense, then, is it 
true to describe our experience of a picture of O as a form of experience of O? Until we 
are told, the strategy saves the Acquaintance Principle from modification only at the cost 
of rendering it obscure. We do better, I think, to acknowledge the differences between 
pictorial and direct experience, and to modify the Principle so as to allow for either. 
Should this concession extend beyond the visual case? Are there analogues of 
pictures for the other sense modalities? These would be representations, belonging to the 
broader family of icons/mimetic symbols, that offer a legitimate route to aesthetic belief, 
for aesthetic properties that cannot be appreciated visually. Although the question is 
interesting, I set it aside. We have forced a concession. We can worry another day about 
how extensive it should be. 
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VII. 
The last method on our list is the use of the sensory imagination. If I can judge O’s 
beauty (or clumsiness or harmony) in a picture of it, or in seeing it face-to-face, then why, 
one might wonder, should I not do so in visualizing it? After all, these are the three forms 
in which things can be presented visually: seeing, seeing pictures, and visual imagining. 
What the first two can do, one might suspect, so can the third. If so, another concession is 
in the offing. For it is clear that visual imagining is distinct from seeing. This is so even if 
we want to group them, along with pictorial seeing, in a wider class called ‘visual 
experience’. Since our understanding of that wider class remains intuitive and vague, 
again we would do better to modify the Principle so as explicity to allow for imagining as 
a route to aesthetic belief. And this time the concession should extend readily to other 
modalities. For if I can judge the elegance of a face in visualizing it, surely I can equally 
judge the beauty of a melody in imagining how it would sound, and likewise for whatever 
aesthetic properties figure in the ‘baser’ senses. 
I am inclined to accept the concession thus pressed. In the past, I thought that 
visualizing was precisely on a par with pictorial seeing, in terms of the access it offers us 
to beauty and other aesthetic properties (Hopkins 1997, 1998). That is, visualizing offers 
a way to judge those properties, because it offers a way to savour them. Nowadays, I am 
much more sceptical about the latter claim. It is very easy to think of imagining as a 
perfect substitute for perception, at least in terms of its ability to elicit affect. However, I 
now think it a mistake to think of the two as equivalent in this way. In the perceptual 
case, affect is a response to what we perceive. In the imaginative case, affect, rather than 
being a response to what is imagined, is at least often also part of what we imagine. If this 
is true of the responses that constitute our savouring beauty and engaging with other 
aesthetic properties, then sensory imagining does not, after all, offer a new means by 
which we can savour the aesthetic aspect of things. Savouring does not occur, it is at most 
imagined as occurring. 
However, my change of heart on the issue of savouring leaves the issue of judging 
untouched. Even if we don’t judge beauty (etc.) in imagining by savouring it, it doesn’t 
follow that we don’t judge it at all. And it seems we are indeed able to make such 
judgements. How else do we know how to decorate a room, which clothes to wear with 
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others, or what to add to the mix to improve the music we are making? Of course, trial 
and error is sometimes an option. But sometimes it is not; and, even where it is, often it is 
not the method we use. In the absence of Principles of Taste to guide us, we have few 
resources beyond our own powers to summon the prospective combination imaginatively. 
Thus we need a second modification to the Acquaintance Principle. Incorporating the 
concession argued for in the last section and the earlier strengthening (§3) at the same 
time, the result should be something like this: 
 
Modified Strengthened Acquaintance Principle: S’s belief on an aesthetic matter is 
legitimate only if  
 
(1) S has either (i) experienced for herself, (ii) seen a picture of, or (iii) sensorily 
imagined, the object that belief concerns 
 and 
(2) grasps in experience (of the relevant form) that the belief is true. 
 
This still excludes a good deal: reliance on the testimony of others; inference from 
Principles of Taste (however one knows of the minor premises of such arguments); and 
exercises of Sibleyan taste, in cases where the role of (i), (ii) or (iii) is limited to giving 
one access to the properties that provide the basis for that exercise. 
 
VIII. 
Thus far I have considered how best to formulate the Principle, the obvious concessions 
to make to keep it plausible without abandoning its spirit, and which of the various 
candidate routes to aesthetic belief it lets in or keeps out. However, there is a deeper issue 
of interpretation we have yet to consider. The Acquaintance Principle is a norm 
governing the legitimate sources of aesthetic belief. But there are two quite different roles 
such a norm might play. Although those advocating the Principle have not noticed this 
distinction, which role they have in mind makes an enormous difference to their position. 
The Acquaintance Principle might be offered as a norm governing the epistemology 
of aesthetic belief. So read, it purports to govern which beliefs count as knowledge. 
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‘Legitimate belief’, on this reading of the principle, is belief which meets a necessary 
condition on knowledge. Illegitimate belief is belief the source of which already prevents 
it from counting as knowledge, however other issues (such as its truth) come out. On this 
way of taking the Principle, in effect it claims that aesthetics is an area in which there are 
only rather limited routes to knowledge. Elsewhere, inference, reliance on testimony and 
the like can yield knowledge. Here, only one’s own experience, in one of the three forms 
identified above, will do. 
The other sort of view gives the Principle a very different role. For all this position 
claims, aesthetics is an area in which the routes to knowledge are as various and as 
reliable as in any other. Testimony, for instance, can make knowledge available to one, 
whether the issue in question is aesthetic or otherwise. Not, of course, that that means that 
testimony can be a legitimate source of aesthetic belief. That it is not is, after all, one of 
the consequences of the Principle, and this position too is defined, in part, by its 
allegiance to the Principle. How can testimony be a source of knowledge without being a 
legitimate source of belief? It can only if the norms governing aesthetic belief govern 
more than simply its epistemology. The Principle, in particular, is a further norm, one that 
might be infringed even when the epistemology of the situation has worked out right. In 
effect, it tells one that, whatever the possible sources of aesthetic knowledge, only some 
of those sources are ones it is legitimate to exploit. 
We might think of these two approaches as differing over whether or not the Principle 
is an epistemic norm. However, in at least one respect that terminology is unhelpful. 
Whatever its role, the content of the Principle concerns legitimate belief—just look at any 
of the formulations above. That gives it some claim to be epistemic, whatever we intend 
for it. I think it more lucid to describe the two positions as differing over whether the 
Principle is a norm of Availability or a norm of Use. For they differ over whether the 
Principle tells us which methods for forming aesthetic belief make knowledge available, 
or which methods, of those that make knowledge available, are ones we may use in 
forming aesthetic belief. 
Note that the view on which the Principle is a norm of Use does not deny that 
legitimate aesthetic belief must have a chance of counting as knowledge. That is 
necessary to the belief’s legitimacy, but not sufficient. Perhaps all this talk of 
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‘knowledge’ will sound unappealingly cognitivist. Personally, I think knowledge comes 
cheap—we can use the notion without undertaking any significant commitments on the 
metaphysics or semantics of aesthetic judgement. If so, the distinction as I have framed it 
should be available to all, whatever their meta-aesthetic views. But even if that is wrong, 
it should be relatively easy to draw the distinction within a subjectivist framework. It’s 
obvious that there can be these two roles for the Principle. If your framework can’t 
accommodate it straight off, you’d better hope it can with a little finesse. 
As I noted, no one has drawn the distinction between Availability and Use. Go back 
to the quotation from Wollheim from which we began. He simply does not tell us which 
role the Principle he articulates is to play. Is the ‘must’ equivalent to ‘must, to have some 
chance to count as knowledge’ or is it ‘must, if it is to meet all the norms governing 
aesthetic belief’? Nor is Wollheim alone. Kant never formulates the Principle explicitly, 
but a good deal of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement is devoted to exploring very 
similar thoughts. Yet nothing he says commits him to advocating a position on 
Availability, rather than on Use. Perhaps it is natural to take those who did not explicitly 
draw the distinction to have Availability in mind. After all, the idea of norms governing 
knowledge is familiar; that of further norms governing belief rather less so. Nonetheless, 
it is surely an open question whether at every stage earlier writers kept their eye firmly on 
the epistemic ball. Not noting the alternative possibility, they may easily have slipped 
between discussing the Principle in one guise and in the other. 
The point is more than exegetical. Once one sees the distinction, one surely needs to 
reckon with it at every stage. Consider the debate over aesthetic testimony (Hopkins 
2000; Meskin 2004). Those optimistic about the legitimacy of taking our aesthetic beliefs 
from others often ask how, if there’s something to know in the aesthetic case, it could fail 
to be possible, at least in the right circumstances, to pass it on through testimony. That’s a 
fair question, but one that only engages with the Principle as a norm of Availability. If we 
offer it as a norm of Use, the question is simply irrelevant. And the moral is surely more 
general. Arguments for or against the Acquaintance Principle will only succeed if they 
are directed at the right target. Now that we see there are two roles the Principle might 
play, we need to revisit the whole debate with that distinction firmly in mind. I will not 
attempt to settle here which role the Principle is best deployed in filling. I will not, 
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therefore, retreat even in part from my promise not to defend the Principle. What I hope 
to have done is to persuade those interested in the Principle, be they hostile or 
sympathetic, to consider the horizons that open up, once we see that behind one formula 
two quite different positions lie. 
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